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Abstract
This paper develops an overlapping-generation model featuring four types of
households: single female, single male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner
couple. The paper considers majority voting over public pension in the presence of
derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples. In an economy with a low in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, borrowing-constrained one-breadwinner cou-
ples may prefer a lower tax rate than do other types of households, although the for-
mer attain a higher benet-to-cost ratio of public pension than do others. Changes
in the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction of two-
breadwinner couples produce an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant
variable and the tax rate.
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1 Introduction
Most OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries o¤er
pension benets for non-working spouses and divorcees. The benets, called derived
pension rights, include (i) survivorsbenets for widows; (ii) benets for divorced spouses;
and (iii) spousal benets as a supplement to a workers benet (Choi, 2006; Leroux
and Pestieau, 2011). These benets imply that derived pension rights have an intra-
generational redistribution component from working singles and two-breadwinner couples
to one-breadwinner couples. Thus, recent pension reforms in many OECD countries that
attempt to link contributions and benets more closely (OECD, 2011) may provoke an
intra-generational conict over pension policy.
Despite the conict among singles and couples caused by derived pension rights, there
are few studies focusing on these rights in the political-economic literature. Exceptions
are the works of Leroux and Pestieau (2012) and Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011).
Leroux and Pestieau (2012) consider an economy composed of couples who maximize
the joint lifetime utility of a husband and a wife. A husband always works regardless
of his labor productivity, while a wife chooses whether or not to work depending on her
reservation wage. Under this framework, Leroux and Pestieau (2012) demonstrate an
interaction between a wifes labor supply decision and pension policy preferences, and
they show that a pension system with derived pension rights is likely to emerge as a
voting equilibrium outcome.
Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011) assume that the degree of derived pension
rights is xed. Instead, they allow for the presence of single males and females and
examine how the degree of derived pension rights a¤ects tax burden policy preferences
for public pensions and thus a resulting pension system via voting. Their results are as
follows: (1) a reduction of derived pension rights results in a smaller tax burden for public
pension, and (2) an increase in the share of two-breadwinner couples have two opposing
e¤ects on the pension burden, where the net e¤ect may be positive or negative depending
on other economic factors.
The results in Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011) provide signicant policy pre-
dictions for public pensions. However, their results heavily depend on the following two
assumptions: quasi-linear utility and no borrowing constraints. The rst assumption,
which is often adopted in the political-economic analyses of social security (see, for exam-
ple, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003, 2004, 2005; Borck, 2007), makes the analysis tractable,
but draws attention away from the considerable e¤ect of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution on a households decisions concerning saving and voting (Casamatta et al.,
2000; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007; Cremer et al., 2007; Arawatari and Ono, 2011). The
second assumption allows for borrowing against future pension benets, which is di¢ cult
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to support from the empirical viewpoint (Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin, 1999). The aim of this paper is to relax these two assumptions in the
framework of Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011) and to provide new insight into
derived pension rights from a political-economic viewpoint.
For analytical purposes, we will extend the framework of Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero
(2011) in the following two ways. First, the preferences of each household are represented
by a utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Second, each
household is unable to borrow against its future pension benets. Under this extended
framework, we show the following two results. First, in an economy where an intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is below one, one-breadwinner couples who benet from
public pensions may prefer a lower, rather than higher, tax rate than single females who
owe net burden, because of the presence of borrowing constraints. Borrowing-constrained
one-breadwinner couples want to choose a low tax rate to keep their after-tax income level
as high as possible. There is then a voting equilibrium, much like an ends-against-the-
middle equilibrium, in which single females, along with the old, form a coalition against
the others.
Secondly, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one, an inverse
U-shaped relationship is created between the relevant variable and the tax rate due to
the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the ratio of two-breadwinner
couples. Near the maximum of the inverse U-shaped curve, the decisive voter is borrowing-
unconstrained on one side and borrowing-constrained on the other side. This two-toned
e¤ect, as well as the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, both of which were not shown
in Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011), are derived by the presence of a borrowing
constraint associated with a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 demonstrates the utility maximization of singles, one-breadwinner
couples, and two-breadwinner couples. Section 4 presents the political institution and
pension policy preferences of the young and the old. Section 5 characterizes the political
equilibrium. Section 6 performs a comparative statics analysis and shows how gender
wage gap, derived pension rights, and the share of two-breadwinner couples a¤ect the
equilibrium pension policy. Section 7 provides concluding remarks. Proofs are provided
in the Appendix.
2
2 The Economic Environment1
Consider a discrete time economy in which time is denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    . The economy
is comprised of overlapping generations of individuals, each of whom lives for two dened
periods: youth and old age. Each generation is composed of a continuum of agents.
Specically, in each generation, there are males and females; the size of each gender
population is normalized to unity. Thus, the total population size of each generation is
two.
Each generation consists of four di¤erent categories of households: single males, single
females, one-breadwinner couples, and two-breadwinner couples. The total population of
each generation is divided as follows: (1   ') single females, ' females in couples where
 of them are workers and 1    of them are non-workers, (1   ') single males and '
males in couples. The allocation of households is xed over time. For simplicity, marriage
decisions are not factored into the analysis.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor in youth and retires in old age. Males
supply labor regardless of their marital status, while only females who are single or belong
to two-breadwinner couples supply labor. Females who belong to one-breadwinner couples
do not supply labor; instead, they devote their time to home production and leisure, both
of which are assumed not to have an e¤ect on utility or household income.
In this economy, there are two types of heterogeneity between males and females: wage
and longevity. These types are characterized by the parameter pairs (wm; m) for males
and (wf ; f ) for females, such that
(wm; m) = (w; );  2 (0; 1);
(wf ; f ) = (w; 1);  2 (0; 1);
where wi (i = f;m) represents the wage, and i represents the probability of surviving in
old age. The term  2 (0; 1) represents the gender wage gap; an increase in  implies a
reduction of the gender wage gap. The term  2 (0; 1) represents the longevity di¤erence
between males and females. It is assumed that females have a longer life span than males
but obtain a lower wage.
Individuals contribute to the pension system during youth and receive a pension ben-
ets in old age. Following the convention in the literature, we present the loss of e¢ ciency
in taxation by assuming convex costs for collecting taxes (see, for example, Casamatta,
Cremer, and Pestieau, 2000; Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007; Borck, 2007; Cremer et
al., 2007). The actual tax revenue from the young is therefore given by
(1  )  [w + w(1  ') + w'] ;
1Since the framework is based on that in Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011), a part of description
in this section follows Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011).
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where the terms w, w(1  '), and w' in the square brackets correspond to the con-
tributions by males, single females, and females who belong to two-breadwinner couples,
respectively. The term (1 ) is the distortionary factor. The assumption of distortionary
taxation is made solely to ensure an interior solution to preferred tax rates and otherwise
plays no role.
Let p denote pension benets for contributors; let p denote pension benets for non-
contributors, where  2 [0; 1] represents the level of derived pension rights. The total
pension payments are
p  [ + (1  ') + '+ '(1  )] :
The pension benet for males is p, rather than p, because their length of life in old age
is assumed to be  2 [0; 1).
Under the assumption of a balanced budget, the government budget constraint be-
comes
p = w()(1  ); (1)
where
()  1 +  (1  '+ ')
 + 1  '+ '+ '(1  ) :
The tax rate  is determined via majority voting, whereas the degree of derived pension
rights  is assumed to be xed at the constitutional level. Voting over  will be discussed
in Section 7.2
3 Economic Decisions
Let j = f;m; c1, and c2 denote single females, single males, one-breadwinner couples,
and two-breadwinner couples, respectively. In this section, we illustrate the economic
decisions on saving by singles and couples. An old agent does not make any economic
decisions because his/her saving is predetermined during youth.
3.1 Singles
Each single agent is assumed to receive utility from private consumption. The lifetime
utility function of a type-j (j = f;m) single young agent is specied by:
U j =
(cj)1    1
1   +  
(dj)1    1
1   ;
2The paper makes several assumptions: the fraction of each type of household is xed; the pension
benets are equal for all contributors; and the derived pension rights are xed. We employ these assump-
tions to keep the comparability with the result in Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011), and to shed
light on the roles of borrowing constraint and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, both of which
were abstracted away in Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011).
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where cj is consumption in youth, dj is consumption in old age,  2 (0; 1) is a discount
factor, and (> 0) is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A lower
1= implies a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution.3
Type-js (j = f;m) individual budget constraints in youth and in old age are respec-
tively given by,
cj + sj  (1  )wj;
dj  sj + jp;
where sj is saving,  is the income tax rate, and p is the per capita pension benet. If
j = f , then wf = w and f = 1; if j = m, then wm = w and m = . For the
tractability of analysis, we assume that the gross rate of interest is equal to one. In
addition, we assume borrowing constraints, that is, sj  0. This constraint precludes
the possibility of borrowing when young against future pension benets (Diamond and
Hausman, 1984; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1999).
A type-j young agent maximizes his/her utility subject to his/her budget constraint
and the borrowing constraint. When sj > 0, the rst-order condition for an interior
solution is dj = ()1= cj. This condition determines an interior solution of saving by a
type-j agent. By taking the borrowing constraint into account, the saving function of a
type-j agent becomes
sj = max
(
0;
()1=
1 + ()1=
"
(1  )wj   
jp
()1=
#)
; j = f;m: (2)
The saving function (2) and the government budget constraint (1) imply that there is
a critical rate of tax such that
sf > 0,  < ^ f   ()
1=
() ;
sm > 0,  < ^m  ()
1=
() :
The critical rate for single males, ^m, is higher than that for single females, ^ f , because
single males obtain higher wages and live shorter than do single females.
With the saving function and the private and government budget constraints, we can
obtain the consumption functions of a type-j (= f;m) agent in youth and in old age.
We use the functions to obtain the indirect utility function of type-j singles, denoted by
V j(j = f;m) :
V j =
(
V js>0  11 

1
1+()1=
 
 [(1  )wj + jw()(1  )]1    1+
1  if  < ^
j;
V js=0  11  ((1  )wj)
1 
+ 
1  fjw()(1  )g
1    1+
1  if   ^ j:
3For j = m, the second-period utility might be more appropriately written as f(dj)1  1g=(1 )
since  is interpreted as the probability of surviving to the second period of life. Following Borck (2007),
we assume away the e¤ect of  on the second-period utility for the tractability of analysis.
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The function V js>0 (j = f;m) denotes the indirect utility of a type-j young household
when it saves some portion of income, and V js=0 denotes the indirect utility when it is
faced with a borrowing constraint and saves nothing. The term in square brackets in
the equation of V js>0 represents the lifetime income; the rst and the second terms on the
right-hand side in the equation for V js=0 represent the utilities of consumption in youth and
in old age, respectively; the constant term, (1 + )=(1   ), summarizes the parameters
unrelated to the political decision on taxes.
3.2 Couples
We next consider consumption decisions by couples. Following Leroux, Pestieau, and
Racionero (2011), we adopt the unitary model of a household that has only one set of
preferences:
U j = 2 

(cj)1    1
1   +  
(dj)1    1
1  

; j = c1; c2:
Under this specication, spouses play cooperatively and share their resources over their
lifecycle.4
A couple chooses consumption and saving to maximize the household utility subject
to the budget constraints in youth and old age:
2cj + sj  (1  )wj;
2dj  sj + ( + j)p:
The borrowing constraint is sj  0, where wc1 = w, wc2 = (1 + )w; c1 =  and c2 = 1.
In the rst period of life, a husband and/or wife work and earn the after-tax wage
income, (1   )wj. A couple consumes a part of the after-tax wage and saves the rest
for old-age consumption. In the second period of life, the couple obtains the return from
savings, sj, the pension benet paid to the husband, p, and that to the wife, jp.
By taking the borrowing constraint into account, the saving function of the type-j
couple becomes
sj = max
(
0;
()1=
1 + ()1=
"
(1  )wj   ( + 
j)p
()1=
#)
; j = c1; c2 (3)
The saving function (3) and the government budget constraint (1) imply that there is a
4An alternative model of a household is to assume that members of a family cannot cooperate because
they cannot communicate with one another, and so the best that they can do is to behave according to
the denition of a Nash equilibrium (Ermisch, 2003, p.22). This alternative modeling may produce a
result di¤erent from that achieved in the current model. However, we adopt the unitary model to keep
the comparability with the result in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011). The author would like to
thank one of the referees for pointing out an alternative option.
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critical tax rate for couples such that
sc1 > 0,  < ^ c1  ()
1=
( + )() ;
sc2 > 0,  < ^ c2  (1 + ) ()
1=
( + 1)() :
With the saving function and the private and government budget constraints, we can
obtain the consumption functions in youth and in old age. We use these functions to
derive a type-j couples indirect utility function:
V j =

V js>0 if  < ^
j;
V js=0 if   ^ j;
where:
V js>0 
1
1  

1
2
 

 
1
1 + ()1=
! 
 (1  )wj + ( + j)w()(1  )1    2 (1 + )
1   ;
V js=0 
1
1  

1
2
 
  (1  )wj1  + 
1  

1
2
 
 ( + j)w()(1  )	1    2 (1 + )
1  
The function V js>0 denotes the indirect utility of a type-j couple when it saves in youth,
and V js=0 denotes the indirect utility when it is faced with a borrowing constraint and
saves nothing in youth. The interpretation of each term in these equations follows that
o¤ered for singles.
4 The Political Institution and Policy Preferences
The tax rate  is determined by individuals through a political process of majority voting.
Elections take place every period and all living individuals, both young and old, cast a
ballot over  . The tax preferences of young individuals are represented by the indirect
utility functions presented in the previous section. The tax preferences of old agents are
determined by the size of the pension because their saving when young is predetermined
and has no critical e¤ect on voting behavior. Every individual has zero mass, and thus
no individual vote can change the outcome of the election. We thus assume individuals
vote sincerely.
The majority voting game is intrinsically dynamic because it describes the interaction
among successive generations. To address this feature, we assume commitment, or in
other words, once-and-for-all-voting. Here, voters determine the constant sequence of
the parameters: t = t+1 =  for all t, where t denotes the tax rate in period t (see,
for example, Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000; Cond-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007).
We can view the full commitment solution as the solution that includes intergenerational
7
interaction because the full commitment solution can be supported as the subgame perfect
equilibrium in repeated voting (see, for example, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003, 2005;
Poutvaara, 2006).
Given the stationary environment, the current model presents a static voting game.
Therefore, the median voter theorem can be applied to the voting game. To nd the
voting equilibrium, we need to show that tax preferences of voters are single-peaked. As
for the tax preferences of old voters, their objective is to maximize their pension benets
regardless of their marriage status, labor supply, and saving. Although the benet levels
di¤er between old agents, the factor related to political decision is common to all old
agents and is specied by the La¤er curve (1  ). Thus, the tax preferences of the old
are single-peaked; their preferred tax rate, denoted by  oj, is  oj = 1=2 8j = f;m; c1; c2.
4.1 Policy Preferences of the Young
Next, let us consider the preferences of the young. To show that the preferences of a
young agent who belongs to a type-j (j = f;m; c1;m2) household are single peaked,
we should note that the following three properties hold. First, @2V js>0=@
2 < 0 and
@2V js=0=@
2 < 0 hold; that is, V js>0 and V
j
s=0 are single peaked. Second, the indirect utility
V j of a young agent in a type-j household is continuous at  = ^ j: V js>0

=^j
= V js>0

=^j
;
j = f;m; c1; c2. Third, the slope of V js>0 at  = ^
j is equivalent to that of V js=0 at  = ^
j:
@V js>0
@

=^j
=
@V js=0
@

=^j
; j = f;m; c1; c2:
The details of the calculation are given in Appendix A.1. The three properties imply that
V j has a unique maximum. In what follows, we derive the conditions that determine the
tax rates preferred by four types of households.
First, consider a preferred tax rate by a young single female agent. Suppose that she
prefers a positive tax rate:  > 0. She chooses  that satises @V fs>0=@ = 0 when she
is borrowing-unconstrained; and  that satises @V fs=0=@ = 0 when she is borrowing-
constrained. After some calculation, we can nd that the preferred tax rate by single
females satises:
LHS  1  2 = RHSf 
( 
() if  < ^
f ;
1



()
1 
 () if   ^ f : (4)
The terms LHS and RHSf represent the marginal e¢ ciency loss of taxation and the
marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution, respectively. Single females choose the tax
rate that balances these terms.
Condition (4) determines the preferred tax rate by single females provided that they
prefer a positive tax rate. However, single females may want to prefer no taxation and
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thus no redistribution via pension when the marginal cost of redistribution is larger than
the marginal benet of redistribution at  = 0, that is, when @V fs>0=@

=0
 0 (,
(1   )='(1   )  ) holds. Therefore, the preferred tax rate by single females,
denoted by  f , is summarized as:
 f = 0 if 1 
'(1 )  ;
 f (> 0) satises (4) otherwise.
Following the same procedure, we can immediately nd that @V ms>0=@ j=0  0 always
holds. The preferred tax rate by single males, denoted by m, becomes m = 0:5
The next task is to nd preferred tax rates by couples. As in the case of a single female,
we rst suppose that couples prefer a positive tax rate and compute their preferred tax
rate as follows. A preferred tax rate by one-breadwinner couples satises:
LHS  1  2 = RHSc1 
( 1
(+)() if  < ^
c1;
1


1
(+)()
1 
 () if   ^ c1; (5)
and a preferred tax rate by two-breadwinner couples satises:
LHS  1  2 = RHSc2 
( 1+
(+1)() if  < ^
c2;
1


1+
(+1)()
1 
 () if   ^ c2: (6)
Taking into account of the case where couples prefer no redistribution, we nd that a
preferred tax rate by one-breadwinner couples, denoted by  c1, satises:
 c1 = 0 if   1 
1+
;
 c1(> 0) satises (5) otherwise;
and a preferred tax rate by two-breadwinner couples, denoted by  c2, satises:
 c2 = 0 if 1 
1+
 ;
 c2(> 0) satises (6) otherwise.
Two remarks are in order. First, single males always prefer no taxation and thus
no redistribution because they always pay more than they receive. Second, the threshold
value of the derived pension rights for one-breadwinner couples coincides with that for two-
breadwinner couples. However, the order of preferences of the one-breadwinner couples
is the total opposite to that of the two-breadwinner couples because the one-breadwinner
5After some calculation, we obtain:
@V ms>0
@

=0
 0, 1  1
() , (  1) (1  '(1  ))| {z }
LHS
 '(1  )| {z }
RHS
;
where LHS < 0 < RHS.
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couples obtain more benets whereas the two-breadwinner couples obtain fewer benets
as the degree of derived pension right becomes higher.
The above-mentioned two properties are qualitatively identical to those demonstrated
by Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011). However, by taking account of borrowing
constraint and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we can nd non-monotone
e¤ects of gender wage gap, derived pension rights and the fraction of two-breadwinner
couples on the equilibrium tax, which were not observed in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero
(2011). This point will be investigated in the following sections. Before going to the next
section, we would like to consider more in detail the roles of borrowing constraint and an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the determination of a preferred tax rates.
4.2 The Role of Marginal Cost-to-benet Ratio of Redistribu-
tion
The result in Section 4.1 presents the preferred tax rates by single females, single males,
one-breadwinner couples, and two-breadwinner couples, respectively. The intuition for
the corner solution is described in Section 4.1. To understand the reasoning behind the
interior solution, let us consider the single females condition, (4), as an example. In
particular, we focus on the parameters  and , representing the gender wage gap and
the degree of derived pension rights, respectively. They are observed on the right-hand
side of (4); they a¤ect the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution.
There are two opposing e¤ects on the ratio via the terms  and . First, given a tax
rate, an increase in  (i.e., an increase in femaleswage) imposes a further tax burden
on a single female via the term  on the numerator of the right-hand side in (4); and
an increase in  (i.e., an increase in the degree of derived pension rights) produces fewer
benets for a single female via the term (). Greater burden and fewer benets give her
an incentive to choose a lower tax rate and thus a smaller size of redistribution, resulting
in a negative e¤ect on the preferred tax rate. Second, an increase in  augments wage
income for single females, and thus pension benets in old age, because the total wages
on which the tax is levied are increased. This augmentation gives a young single female
an incentive to choose a higher tax rate, resulting in a positive e¤ect on the preferred tax
rate via the term ().
When a young single female is borrowing-unconstrained, she can reallocate income
freely across periods. Because of this intertemporal reallocation of income, the positive
e¤ect is compensated for by the negative e¤ect regardless of the degree of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Therefore, increases in  and  result in a higher marginal
cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution and thus a lower preferred tax rate when a young
single female is borrowing-unconstrained. The result holds regardless of 1= because the
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objective for a borrowing-unconstrained household is to maximize lifetime income, which
is independent of 1=.
When a single female is borrowing-constrained, the positive e¤ect is not necessarily
compensated for by the negative one. The borrowing-constrained single female wants to
consume more when young, but her demand is restricted by the borrowing constraint. In
this situation, the borrowing-constrained individual attaches a large weight to the utility
gain of an increase in her wage. This e¤ect might lead to a situation in which the positive
e¤ect overcomes the negative one, resulting in a lower, rather than higher, marginal cost-
to-benet ratio of redistribution and thus a higher preferred tax rate in response to an
increase in  or .
Which e¤ect outweighs the other depends on the degree of an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. A lower elasticity implies a stronger incentive for single females to smooth
consumption over periods. Because of this incentive, borrowing-constrained single females
attach a smaller weight to the positive e¤ect on youthful consumption via a decrease in
her preferred tax rate as the elasticity becomes lower. In other words, the positive e¤ect
on the preferred tax rate is more likely to overcome the negative one as the elasticity
becomes lower.
The net e¤ect depends on the degree of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
When the elasticity is high, that is, 1=  1, the net e¤ect on the tax is negative. An
increase in  or  results in a lower preferred tax rate by borrowing-constrained single
females. In contrast, when the elasticity is low, that is, 1= < 1, the net e¤ect becomes
positive. An increase in  or  leads to a higher preferred tax rate.
In concluding this section, we note that the tax rates preferred by the young are lower
than those preferred by the old who choose  = 1=2. The result of this phenomenon is
that the decisive voter with respect to  belongs to the young generation because the
population size of the young is larger than that of the old given the death of some males
in early life. Given this result, we focus on young agentspreferences over  and consider
the determination of  in majority voting in the next section.
5 Political Equilibrium
This section characterizes the political equilibrium of the majority voting. In what follows,
an agentimplies a young agentif not otherwise specied.
5.1 Political Environment
We impose the following assumption to proceed with the analysis.
Assumption 1: max
n
1 
4(1 ) ;
1 
4
o
< ' < 1+
2
.
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Assumption 1 ensures that one who prefers the highest tax rate among the young
becomes a decisive voter. To understand the argument stemming from Assumption 1,
recall that (i) young agents are ranked in terms of their preferred tax rates; (ii) all the old
prefer  = 1=2 which is higher than any other preferred tax rates by the young. However,
the old cannot be majority voters because the number of the old population, 2, is less
than that of the young population, 2:
Given the abovementioned argument, we can nd the decisive voter from the young. In
particular, by imposing Assumption 1, we can determine the identity of the decisive voter
from an agent who prefers the highest tax rate among the young. For example, suppose
that a single female prefers the highest tax rate among the young. She can be a decisive
voter if the number of single females plus the old is larger than half of the population, that
is, if (1 ')+(1+) > (3+)=2, ' < (1+)=2: Following the same argument, we can
say that an agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple becomes a decisive voter if
2'(1 )+(1+) > (3+)=2, ' > (1 )=4(1 ); and an agent who belongs to a two-
breadwinner couple becomes a decisive voter if 2'+(1+) > (3+)=2, ' > (1 )=4:
The three conditions are summarized as in Assumption 1.6
Hereafter, we will focus on the parameter , which represents the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, and consider two cases separately: a high elasticity
case (1=  1) and a low elasticity case (1= < 1). We adopt this classication because
the order of preferences for the tax rate depends critically on the degree of elasticity.
Because the former case includes the case of Leroux, Pestieau, and Racionero (2011) as a
special one, we leave it to Appendix A.5. In what follows here, we will focus exclusively
on the latter case.
5.2 An Economy with 1= < 1
To determine the decisive voter over  when 1= < 1, we recall the conditions demon-
strated in Section 4.1 that determine the preferred tax rates by four types of house-
holds. Because  = (1   )=(1 + ) is the threshold value of the derived pension
rights common to one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples, we consider two cases,
 2 [0; (1  )=(1 + )] and  2 ((1  )=(1 + ); 1] in turn.
5.2.1 Low Level of Derived Pension Rights: 0    1 
1+
First, we consider the case of a low level of derived pension rights. In this case, single
males and one-breadwinner couples prefer no taxation, whereas single females and two-
breadwinner couples prefer taxation. Figure 1 illustrates the conditions (4) and (6) that
6A single male cannot be a decisive voter because he always prefers no taxation.
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determine the preferred tax rates by single females and two-breadwinner couples, respec-
tively. As depicted in the gure, there is a critical value of  , ~ f;c2 2  ^ f ; ^ c2, such that
RHSf and RHSc2 intersect at  = ~ f;c2. By direct calculation, we obtain:
~ f;c2 

(1 + )
( + 1)()
 1




()
 1

:
[Figure 1 about here.]
The tax rate preferred by a type-j (j = f; c2) household is determined by the crossing
point of LHS and RHSj. Given the assumption of household distribution in Assumption
1, the decisive voter over  is the one who prefers the highest tax rate among the young
households. Based on the illustration in Figure 1, the decisive voter over  when 1= < 1
and  2 0; 1 
1+

is determined as follows.
Lemma 1. Suppose that 1= < 1 and  2 0; 1 
1+

hold. There exists a unique
equilibrium of the voting game with  2 (0; 1=2). The decisive voter over  is
(i) a type-f single female agent if ()  2

(1+)
+1
 1
  () 1 + 1+
+1
;
(ii) a type-c2 agent who belongs to a two-breadwinner couple, otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
To understand the mechanism behind the result, recall the condition that produces
an equilibrium in which a type f single female agent becomes a decisive voter in Lemma
1. The condition is rewritten as:
1  
1+
'(1  )
1  '(1 )(1 )
+1
 2 () 1  ( + 1)1  1 


1 + 
 1

+ 1; (7)
where the left-hand side is decreasing in , and the right-hand side is increasing in .
Therefore, the condition (7) states that a type-f agent is more likely to become a decisive
voter when  is higher (that is, when the gender wage gap is smaller).
The intuition behind the condition (7) is as follows: For a low degree of derived pension
rights such that  2 [0; (1  )=(1 + )], single females expect a high level of pension
benets in old age, which gives them a disincentive to save. Thus, single females would
be borrowing constrained for a low degree of derived pension rights. In this situation,
they owe greater tax burden as  becomes higher (i.e., as their wage becomes higher).
However, when 1= < 1, an increase in  results in a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio
of redistribution and thus a higher preferred tax rate by borrowing-constrained single
females as demonstrated in Section 4.2. Therefore, type-f agents prefer a higher tax rate
than type-c2 agents when  is high such that (7) holds.
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5.2.2 High Level of Derived Pension Right: 1 
1+
<   1
Next, let us consider the case of a high level of derived pension rights. In this case,
single males and two-breadwinner couples prefer no taxation, whereas single females and
one-breadwinner couples prefer taxation. Figure 2 illustrates the conditions (4) and (5)
that determine the preferred tax rates by single females and one-breadwinner couples,
respectively.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The current case could be divided at most into the following three sub-cases: (2-a) a
case of  2  1 
1+
;min

1 

; 1
	
(see Panel (a)); (2-b) a case of  2

1 

;min
n
1 
'(1 ) ; 1
o
provided that 1 < (1+ ) holds (see Panel (b)); and (2-c) a case of  2
h
1 
'(1 ) ; 1
i
(see
Panel (c)) provided that 1 
(1 ) < ' holds. As depicted in the gure, there are critical
values of the tax, ~ f;c1 for the case (2-a), and ~ c1;f for the case (2-b), dened by:
~ f;c1 


( + )()
 1




()
 1

; ~ c1;f 


()
 1



1
( + )()
 1

respectively. As in the previous subsection, we can characterize the political equilibrium
for the current case as follows.
Lemma 2. Suppose that 1= < 1 and  2  1 
1+
; 1

hold. There exists a unique
equilibrium of the voting game with  2 (0; 1=2). The decisive voter over  is
(i) a type-f single female agent if:
 2

1  
1 + 
;min

1  

; 1

and ()  2


 + 
 1

 () 1 + 1
 + 
;
or if:
 2

1  

; 1

; 1 < (1 + ) and () > 2 () 1 

1
 + 
 1

+ ;
(ii) a type-c1 agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
The main di¤erence from the previous case is that a type-c2 agent cannot be a decisive
voter; instead, a type-c1 agent can be a decisive voter under a certain condition. The
change of the decisive voter is due to that, in the current case, a type-c1 agent attains
a higher pension benet because of a higher level of derived pension rights relative to
the previous case. This relationship results in a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio of
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redistribution for a type-c1 agent compared to a type-c2 agent. Therefore, a type-c1 agent
prefers a higher tax rate than does a type-c2 agent.
The two conditions in Lemma 2(i) implies that for a lower , a single female agent
prefers a higher tax rate; and she is more likely to be a decisive voter (see Appendix A3).
This result is qualitatively di¤erent from that in the previous, low-derived pension case:
for a higher , a single female agent prefers higher tax rate; and she is more likely to be
a decisive voter. The di¤erence between the two cases comes from the saving behavior
a¤ected by the degree of derived pension rights.
To understand the role of derived pension rights, suppose that the degree of derived
pension rights is higher than the critical value (1   )=(1 + ). Under this situation,
single females are less likely to be borrowing constrained because they expect a lower level
of pension benets, which gives them an incentive to save more for old-age consumption.
In this situation, a decrease in  results in a decrease of the cost-to-benet ratio of
redistribution for unconstrained single females; and this gives them an incentive to choose
a higher tax rate. Therefore, when  is higher than the critical value (1  )=(1 + ); a
single female agent is more likely to be a decisive voter for a lower .
Alternatively, suppose that the degree of derived pension rights is lower than the
critical value (1  )=(1 + ). Under this assumption, single females are more likely to
be borrowing constrained because they expect a higher level of pension benets and thus
nd less need to save for old-age consumption. In this situation, an increase in  results
in an increase of the cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for constrained single females;
but this gives them an incentive to choose a higher, rather than a lower, tax rate because
single females are borrowing constrained and are faced with a low intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. Therefore, when  is lower than the critical value (1   )=(1 + ), a
single female agent is more likely to be a decisive voter for a higher .
5.2.3 A Decisive Voter When 1= < 1
The results established so far are summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. Suppose that 1= < 1 holds. There exists a unique equilibrium of the
voting game with  2 (0; 1=2). The decisive voter over  is
15
(i) a type-f single female agent if:
 2

0;
1  
1 + 

and ()  2

(1 + )
 + 1
 1

 () 1 +1 + 
 + 1
; or
 2

1  
1 + 
;min

1  

; 1

and ()  2


 + 
 1

 () 1 + 1
 + 
; or
 2

1  

; 1

; 1 < (1 + ) and () > 2 () 1 

1
 + 
 1

+ ;
(ii) a type-c2 agent who belongs to a two-breadwinner couple if:
 2

0;
1  
1 + 

and () > 2

(1 + )
 + 1
 1

 () 1 + 1 + 
 + 1
;
(iii) a type-c1 agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple otherwise.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proposition 1 presents the determination of the identity of the decisive voter in major-
ity voting. A type-f single female agent becomes a decisive voter if the degree of derived
pension rights is low and the gender wage gap is small as demonstrated in the rst condi-
tion of the statement (i); or if the degree of derived pension right is high and the gender
wage gap is large as demonstrated in the second and third conditions of the statement
(i). Interpretations for these results are discussed in the previous subsections.
A type-c2 agent who belongs to a two-breadwinner couple becomes a decisive voter if
the degree of derived pension right is low such that the rst condition in the statement
(ii) holds; and the benet-to-burden ratio of public pension, denoted by (), is high such
that the second condition in the statement (ii) holds. Because () is increasing in , the
latter condition implies that a type-c2 agent is more likely to be a decisive voter when
the fraction of type-c2 agents is larger in the economy.
Finally, a type-c1 agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple becomes a decisive
voter if the conditions in statements (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 fail to hold. In particular,
all types except type-c1 agents prefer no taxation and thus no redistribution via pension
when  > 1 
'(1 ) holds (see Panel (c) of Figure 2). This condition implies that the gender
wage gap is small, the fraction of one-breadwinner couples is large, and the longevity of
men is high. All these factors imply greater benets via pension compared to the cost
of taxation for type-c1 agents. Therefore, type-c1 agents have an incentive to choose
taxation on working agents although all the other types of agents nd it optimal to
choose no taxation.
The e¤ect of the derived pension rights on the identity of the decisive voter is qualita-
tively equivalent to that demonstrated in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011). How-
ever, the e¤ect of gender wage gap on the identity of the decisive voter is di¤erent from that
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in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011). As the gender wage gap becomes smaller, the
marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for single females becomes larger. However,
they prefer a larger size of redistribution as long as they are borrowing constrained with a
low intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Lemma 1). This counterintuitive result was
not demonstrated in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011) who assume a quasi-linear
utility and no borrowing constraint. This di¤erent e¤ect is further investigated in the
next section.
6 Gender Wage Gap, Derived Pension Rights and
the Fraction of Two-breadwinner Couples
Given the characterization of the political equilibrium in Section 5, we investigate how the
tax rate changes in response to recent trends in developed economies: a reduction of the
gender wage gap, a reduction of derived pension rights, and an increase in the fraction of
two-breadwinner couples. The aim of the analysis is to explore the roles of the borrowing
constraint and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the determination of the
tax rate, which were not demonstrated in Leroux, Pestieau and Racionero (2011). The
analysis also aims to discuss policy implications of the result.
6.1 A Reduction of the Gender Wage Gap
First, we investigate the e¤ect of a reduction of the gender wage gap on the determination
of the tax rate.
Proposition 2: In an economy with 1= < 1 where the decisive voter is a type-j
( j = f; c1, or c2) agent, a reduction of the gender wage gap (i.e., an increase in )
locally produces an inverse U-shaped relationship between  and  around ^ j.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
To understand the mechanism behind the result in Proposition 2, we rst note that
there is a critical value of  for a type-j agent, denoted by j (j = f; c1; c2): j is the 
that makes a type-j agent choose  = ^ j (see Figure 3). Around this critical value, there
is a change in the pattern of saving as discussed in the previous sections. In particular,
for j = f and c2, an agent is borrowing constrained for   j; and he/she is borrowing
unconstrained for  > j (see Panel (a) of Figure 3). For j = c1, an agent is borrowing
unconstrained for   j; and he/she is borrowing constrained for  > j (see Panel (b)
of Figure 3). The detail of the mechanism behind the change of saving pattern around j
is shown in Appendix A.4.1.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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Proposition 2 says that starting from a low value of , borrowing-constrained type-f
or type-c2 agent prefers a higher tax rate as  becomes larger (that is, as the gender
wage gap becomes narrower). However, he/she becomes borrowing-unconstrained once 
approaches j; and he/she prefers a lower tax rate as  is further increased. Type-js
(j = f; c2) preferences over the tax qualitatively changes at  = j. As for a type-c1
agent, he/she is borrowing unconstrained for  below his/her critical value c1. For this
range of , he/she prefers a higher tax rate as  becomes larger. However, he/she becomes
borrowing constrained when  is beyond the critical value c1. He/she turns to choose a
lower tax rate in response to a further increase in 
The result described so far could be understood in the following way. We rst con-
sider the e¤ect of an increase in  on the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution,
denoted by RHSj(j = f; c1; c2), when an agent is borrowing-unconstrained. After some
calculation, we obtain
@RHSf
@
> 0;
@RHSc1
@
< 0;
@RHSc2
@
> 0 if sj > 0 (j = f; c1; c2).
When an agent is borrowing-unconstrained, a reduction of the gender wage gap (i.e.,
an increase in ) increases the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for type-f
and type-c2 agents, whereas it decreases the ratio for type-c1 agents. The di¤erence is
due to the fact that single females and two-breadwinner couples owe an additional tax
burden when there is an increase in femaleswages, whereas one-breadwinner couples owe
no additional burden. Because increased tax revenue is returned to all types of agents as
lump-sum pension benets, single females and two-breadwinner couples pay more than
they receive, whereas one-breadwinner couples pay nothing but receive additional benets.
Therefore, a reduction of the gender wage gap results in a higher marginal cost-to-benet
ratio of redistribution and thus a lower preferred tax rate for type-f and type-c2 agents,
whereas it results in a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution and thus a
higher preferred tax rate for type-c1 agents.
The opposite result holds when an agent is borrowing-constrained because the e¤ect
of  on RHSj is reversed as demonstrated in Section 4.2. A reduction of the gender wage
gap results in lower RHSf and RHSc2 and thus in higher preferred tax rates by type-f
and type-c2 agents, whereas it results in a higher RHSc1 and thus in a lower preferred
tax rate by type-c1 agents. Therefore, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between
 and  j around the critical value of the tax, ^ j, that divides the status of saving (see
Panel (c) of Figure 3).
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6.2 A Reduction of Derived Pension Rights
Next, we consider the e¤ect of a reduction of derived pension rights on the determination
of the tax rate.
Proposition 3: In an economy with 1= < 1 where the decisive voter is a type-j
( j = f; c1, or c2) agent, a reduction of derived pension rights (i.e., a decrease in
) produces an inverse U-shaped relationship between  and  around ^ j.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
To understand the result in Proposition 3, we rst note that there is a critical value
of ; j, for a type-j agent: j is the  that makes a type-j agent choose  = ^ j. Around
this critical value, there is a change in the patterns of saving. In particular, for j = f; c2;
an agent is borrowing constrained for   j; he/she is borrowing unconstrained for
 > j: For j = c1; an agent is borrowing unconstrained for  < j; he/she is borrowing
constrained for   j:
Given the saving pattern of each agent, we rst consider the e¤ect of the derived
pension rights on the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution when an agent is
borrowing unconstrained:
( 1)@RHS
f
@
< 0; ( 1)@RHS
c1
@
> 0; ( 1)@RHS
c2
@
< 0 if sj > 0 (j = f; c1; c2)
We multiply the derivatives by ( 1) to demonstrate the qualitative e¤ect of a decrease in
.
A reduction of derived pension rights (i.e., a decrease in ) increases the pension
benets for type-f and type-c2 agents, lowers the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redis-
tribution, and thus raises their preferred tax rate. Therefore, type-f and type-c2 agents
prefer a higher tax rates in response to a reduction of the degree of derived pension rights
as long as  is above the critical value j (j = f; c2). In contrast, such a reduction
decreases the pension benets for type-c1 agents, raises their cost-to-benet ratio of re-
distribution and thus lowers their preferred tax rate. Type-c1 agent prefers a lower tax
rate in response to a reduction of  as long as  is below a critical value c1.
The above result is reversed when an agent is borrowing-constrained as demonstrated
in the case of a change in . Therefore, the two opposing e¤ects result in an inverse
U-shaped relationship between  and  j around the critical value of ; j. The preferred
tax rate is maximized and is given by  = ^ j at  = j:
The result in Proposition 3 di¤ers from that demonstrated in Leroux, Pestieau and
Racionero (2011). They numerically showed that a reduction of derived pension rights
(i.e., a decrease in ) results in decreases in the tax rate and pension size for plausible set
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of parameters. Their monotone result comes from the assumption of quasi-linear utility
and no borrowing constraint. The current paper takes away these assumptions and shows
a non-monotone e¤ect of the derived pension rights on the equilibrium tax.
6.3 An Increase in the Fraction of Two-breadwinner Couples
Finally, we examine the e¤ect of the share of two-breadwinner couples on the equilibrium
tax rate.
Proposition 4: In an economy with 1= < 1 where the decisive voter is a type-j
( j = f; c1, or c2) agent, an increase in the fraction of two-breadwinner couples
(i.e., an increase in ) (a) locally produces an inverse U-shaped relationship between
 and  around ^ j if  6= (1 )=(1+); (b) has no e¤ect on the equilibrium tax
if  = (1  )=(1 + ).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
To understand the result in Proposition 4, let us rst consider how the benet-to-
burden ratio of public pension, denoted by (), is a¤ected by the parameter :
()  1 +  (1  '+ ')
 + 1  '+ '+ '(1  ) .
On one hand, an increase in  results in an increase of tax revenue from the working
females and thus in an increase per capita pension benet. This e¤ect is observed in
the numerator of (). On the other hand, an increase in  implies a larger size of two-
breadwinner couples and a smaller size of one-breadwinner couples. Because the level
of pension rights is larger for working females than for non-working females, an increase
in  results in a decrease of per capita pension benets. This e¤ect is observed in the
denominator of ().
The former positive e¤ect on () is independent of , whereas the latter negative
e¤ect on () is dependent of . Specically, the negative e¤ect becomes larger as 
becomes smaller. Therefore, the negative e¤ect overcomes the positive one when the level
of derived pension rights is low such that  < (1   )=(1 + ): that is, @()=@ < 0
holds if  < (1   )=(1 + ); the opposite holds if  > (1   )=(1 + ): that is,
@()=@ > 0 holds if  > (1   )=(1 + ). The two opposing e¤ects are o¤set each
other if  = (1  )=(1 + ).
In what follows, we consider the case of  < (1   )=(1 + ) and the case of  >
(1   )=(1 + ) in turn. First, for a low degree of derived pension rights such that
 < (1   )=(1 + ), type j = f and j = c2 agents prefer a positive tax rate. A
low degree of derived pension rights for non-working females produces a large size of per
capita pension benets for working females. In addition, a low  (i.e., a low share of
20
two-breadwinner couples) implies a high level of () (i.e., a high benet-to-burden ratio
of public pension) and thus a high level of per capita public pension. These two e¤ects
give types j = f and j = c2 agents a disincentive to save for their old-age consumption.
Thus, they are borrowing constrained for  < (1   )=(1 + ) and  < j. However,
for  > j, a level of per capita pension benets becomes low; and this negative e¤ect
on the size of pension overcomes the positive e¤ect produced by a low degree of derived
pension rights. Therefore, types j = f and j = c2 agents are borrowing unconstrained
for  < (1  )=(1 + ) and  > j.
Based on the abovementioned argument, we can now show the e¤ect of  on the
preferred tax rate by a type-j (j = f; c2) agent when  < (1 )=(1+). First, suppose
that  > j: a type-j (j = f; c2) agent is borrowing unconstrained. In this situation, a
higher  results in a lower size of (), and thus a larger marginal cost-to-benet ratio of
redistribution, RHSj (j = f; c2) in Eqs. (4) and (6). A type-j (j = f; c2) agents prefers
a lower tax rate as  becomes larger for the range of  > j. However, the opposite result
holds for the range of  < j because he/she is borrowing constrained. Therefore, around
j, there arises an inverse U-shaped relationship between  and the preferred tax rate by
the decisive voter.
Next, consider the case of a high degree of derived pension rights such that  >
(1   )=(1 + ): type-f and type-c1 agents prefer a positive tax rate. A high degree
of derived pension rights gives a high level of per capita pension benets for type-c1
agents. However, while it gives a low level of per capita pension benets for type-f
agents, this negative e¤ect on pension size is compensated for by the e¤ect of  via ()
because a higher  results in a larger size of () and thus a larger size of per capita
pension, @()=@ > 0. Therefore, for a high  such that  > j, a type-j (j = f; c1)
agent obtains a large sized pension benet; and this gives him/her a disincentive to save
for old-age consumption, thereby resulting in being borrowing constrained for  > j.
Because @()=@ > 0 holds, a larger  results in a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio
of redistribution for a constrained type-j agent and thus leads to a lower preferred tax
rate by him/her. The opposite result holds for  < j because a type-j (j = f; c1) agent
is borrowing unconstrained due to a low size of pension benets. A larger  results in
a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for a type-j unconstrained agent
and thus results in a higher preferred tax rate.
6.4 Discussion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of changes in  (gender wage gap),  (the degree of derived
pension rights) and  (the fraction of two-breadwinner couples) on the equilibrium tax
rate, and shown the inverse U-shaped relationship between the tax rate and parameters.
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Based on the result demonstrated so far, in this subsection we briey discuss the following
three issues: (i) the e¤ect of longevity gap between males and females on the equilibrium
tax rate, (ii) the e¤ect of a decisive voters switch on the equilibrium tax rate, and (iii)
policy implications of the result.
The current framework assumes that females live two periods, but males die at the end
of youth with probability 1   . The parameter  represents the longevity di¤erence: a
smaller  implies a larger longevity di¤erence between males and females. From equations
(4), (5) and (6), we can immediately nd that a smaller  (i.e., a larger longevity gap)
results in a lower marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for type-f and type-c2
agents, while it results in a higher marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution for type-
c1 agents. Given this result, we can apply the analysis and result established so far and
conclude that type-f and type-c2 agent prefer a higher tax rate in response to an increase
in longevity gap when they are borrowing unconstrained, whereas they prefer a lower tax
rate when they are borrowing constrained. The opposite result holds for type-c1 agents.
Therefore, a change in longevity di¤erence also produces an inverse U-shaped e¤ect on
the equilibrium tax.
The result in this section, combined with the result in Section 5, suggests that the
equilibrium tax would show two peaks in response to changes in parameters. For illus-
trative purpose, assume  < (1   )=2: the result in Lemma 1 holds for any  2 [0; 1],
and the decisive voter is a type-f or type-c2 agent depending on the value of . First, we
take a su¢ ciently low value of  such that the decisive voter is a borrowing-constrained
type-c2 agent. His/her preferred tax rate is increased in response to an increase in 
(i.e., a reduction of gender wage gap), and peaks at c2. A further increase in  makes
him/her to be borrowing-unconstrained; and to prefer a lower tax rate (Proposition 2).
When the value of  approaches beyond the critical level, the decisive voter changes from
a borrowing-unconstrained type-c2 agent to a borrowing-constrained type-f agent. The
same argument holds for a type-f agent: her preferred tax rate attains a peak at f
(Proposition 2). Therefore, there are two peaks of the equilibrium tax rates in response
to changes in .
Finally, we discuss the policy implications of the results. Many developed countries
have been faced with increasing burden of public pension for the past decades. It has been
argued that population aging is one of the most causes for this increasing burden. The
local comparative statics analysis and result in this section provide an alternative view:
decreases in the gender wage gap, the reduction of derived pension rights, and an increase
in the fraction of two-breadwinner couples, observed in developed countries for the past
decades, also provide a political incentive to increase the tax burden of public pension.
However, our analysis and result suggest that further increases in these parameters may
result in a decrease or a non-monotone change in tax burden. This possibility could be
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further investigated in future research.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper developed an overlapping-generation model based on that of Leroux, Pestieau
and Racionero (2011). The model includes four types of households: single female, sin-
gle male, one-breadwinner couple and two-breadwinner couple. The paper introduced a
borrowing constraint into their model and generalized the model by assuming a utility
function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Under this generalized
framework, we consider majority voting over public pension policy in the presence of
derived pension rights, and investigate how the borrowing constraint and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution a¤ect the preferences of each household over pension and the
resulting equilibrium pension policy.
The paper showed the following two results. First, in an economy where an intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution is below one, one-breadwinner couples may prefer a lower,
rather than higher, tax rate than do single females because of the presence of borrowing
constraints. There is an equilibrium, much like an ends-against-the-middle equilibrium,
where the old and single females form a coalition against the others.
Second, the gender wage gap, the level of derived pension rights, and the fraction
of two-breadwinner couples create an inverse U-shaped relationship between the relevant
variable and the tax rate when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one.
This two-toned e¤ect was derived via a borrowing constraint associated with a low in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Throughout the analysis, we assumed that the degree of derived pension rights is
xed. This assumption can be relaxed by assuming a structure-induced Nash equilibrium
of voting (for example, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2003; 2005; Casamatta, Cremer and
Pestieau, 2005; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007; Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008). In this
voting equilibrium, one-breadwinner couples prefer a full derived pension right, whereas
others prefer no right. Thus, the full derived pension right is realized if the number of
one-breadwinner couples is larger than a half of the population; no derived pension right
is realized otherwise. However, in the real world, the degree of the derived pension right
is set between these two extreme solutions. There is a need to add an institutional feature
to demonstrate a more realistic situation: this task is left as future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Single-peaked Preferences of the Young
In this appendix, we prove that preferences of a type-f young agent are single peaked.
The proof applies to other types of young agents.
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that both V fs>0 and V
f
s=0 are single
peaked over  . Then we demonstrate that @V fs>0=@ = @V
f
s=0=@ and V
f
s>0 = V
f
s=0 hold
at  = ^ f , implying that V f has a unique maximum over the whole range of  and thus
that V f is single peaked over  .
The rst and the second derivatives of V y;js>0 and V
y;j
s=0 with respect to  are
@V fs>0
@
=
 
1
1 + ()1=
! 
 [(1  )w + w()(1  )]   f w + w()(1  2)g ;
@2V fs>0
@ 2
=
 
1
1 + ()1=
! 
 ( )  [(1  )w + w()(1  )]  1  f w + w()(1  2)g2
+
 
1
1 + ()1=
! 
 [(1  )w + w()(1  )]   ( 2)w()
< 0;
@V fs=0
@
= [(1  )w]   ( w) +   [w()(1  )]   w()  (1  2);
@2V fs=0
@ 2
= ( )  [(1  )w]  1  (w)2
    [w()(1  )]  1  (w())2  (1  2)2
  2  [w()(1  )]   w()
< 0:
The functions V fs>0 and V
f
s=0 are single peaked over  because the second derivatives are
negative.
Next, we show that @V fs>0=@ = @V
f
s=0=@ and V
f
s>0 = V
f
s=0 hold at  = ^
f . By direct
calculation, we have:
V y;js>0

=^f
= V y;js=0

=^f
=
1
1   
1 + ()1=
1

 
1   ()
1=
()
!1 
 (w)1    1 + 
1   ;
@V y;js>0
@

=^f
=
@V y;js=0
@

=^f
=
 
1   ()
1=
()
! 
 (w)1  

 1 + ()

+ 2 ()1=

:
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With this result and the single-peakedness of V y;js>0 and V
y;j
s=0 over  , we can conclude that
V f has a unique maximum with respect to  over the whole range of  . Specically, V f is
maximized at  = argmaxV fs>0 if argmaxV
f
s>0 < ^
f ; it is maximized at  = argmaxV fs=0
otherwise.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
From Panel (a) of Figure 1, a type-f agent becomes a decisive voter if and only if the
following condition holds:
1  2~ f;c2  1 + 
( + 1)() :
This condition is rewritten as the one in Lemma 1(i). Otherwise, a type-c2 agent becomes
a decisive voter (see Panel (b) of Figure 1).
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that  2  1 
1+
;min

1; 1 

	
holds (see Panel (a) of Figure 2). A type-f
agent becomes a decisive voter if 1   2~ f;c1  1=( + )() holds, that is, if () 
2


+
 1
  () 1 + 1
+
holds.
Next, assume 1 

< 1 (i.e., 1 < (1+)) and  2

1 

;min
n
1; 1 
'(1 )
o
hold (see
Panel (b)). A type-f agent becomes a decisive voter if 1  2~ c1;f > =() holds, that is,
if () > 2 () 1 

1
+
 1

+  holds. When these conditions fail to hold, the decisive
voter becomes a type-c1 agent.
The conditions demonstrated above imply that a single female agent is more likely to
be a decisive voter for a lower . To conrm this statement, let us rewrite the conditions
in Lemma 2(i) as follows:
()  2


 + 
 1

 () 1 + 1
 + 
, f1  '(1  )g [( + )  (1  )=]f( + 1)  (1  )'(1  )g ( + )  2


 + 
 1

 () 1 ; (8)
() > 2 () 1 

1
 + 
 1

+ 
, 1   f + '(1  ))g
( + 1)  (1  )'(1  ) > 2 ()
1=

1
 + 
( 1)=
(9)
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The left-hand side of (8) is increasing in  whereas the right-hand side of (8) is decreas-
ing in ; (8) is more likely to hold for a lower . The left-hand side of (9) is decreasing
in  whereas the right-hand side of (9) is increasing in ; (9) is more likely to hold for a
lower .

A.4 Proof of Propositions 2-4
First, we focus on the terms =(); 1=(+ )() and (1 + )=(+ 1)() that a¤ect the
marginal cost-to-benet ratios of redistribution for type-f; c1 and c2 agents, respectively:
see equations (4), (5) and (6). We denote these terms as:
]RHS
f  
() ;
]RHS
c1  1
( + )() ;
]RHS
c2  1 + 
( + 1)() .
After some calculation, we obtain the following properties of ]RHS
j
(j = f; c1; c2):
@]RHS
f
@
> 0;
@]RHS
c1
@
< 0;
@]RHS
c2
@
> 0; (10)
@]RHS
f
@
> 0;
@]RHS
c1
@
< 0;
@]RHS
c2
@
> 0; (11)
@]RHS
f
@
R 0; @
]RHS
c1
@
R 0; @
]RHS
c2
@
R 0 if and only if  Q 1  
1 + 
: (12)
Consider the political equilibrium in an economy with 1= < 1. The decisive voter in
the current case is a type-f , type-c1 or type-c2 agent (Proposition 1). Because we here
consider the e¤ects of ;  and  around the critical value ^ j dened in Section 3, we
calculate the e¤ects of these parameters on ^ j as follows:
@^ f
@
> 0;
@^ c1
@
< 0;
@^ c2
@
> 0; (13)
@^ f
@
> 0;
@^ c1
@
< 0;
@^ c2
@
> 0; (14)
@^ f
@
R 0; @^
c1
@
R 0; @^
c2
@
R 0 if and only if  Q 1  
1 + 
: (15)
A.4.1 The e¤ect of  on the equilibrium tax rate: Proof of Proposition 2
Consider rst the equilibrium where the decisive voter is a type-f agent. Suppose that 
is initially given such that type-fs preferred tax rate is  = ^ f . We denote f as the 
that makes a type-f young agent choose  = ^ f .
With the property of ]RHS
f
in (10) and the property of ^ f in (13), we nd a positive
real number "(> 0) around f such that the type-f agent is borrowing-constrained for  2
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(f "; f ) and borrowing-unconstrained for  2 [f ; f+"). This statement is conrmed
by looking at Panel (c) of Figure 3. For a low , a preferred tax rate by a type-f agent
is determined by the crossing point of LHS  1  2 and RHSf = (=())1   () =;
showing that she is borrowing constrained. For a high , it is determined by the crossing
point of LHS  1 2 and RHSf = =(); showing that she is borrowing unconstrained.
Therefore, the equilibrium tax rate satises the following condition:
LHS  1  2 = RHSf 
(
1



()
1 
 () for  2 (f   "; f ];

() for  2
 
f ; f + "

:
Given the properties in (10) and (13), we can illustrate the e¤ects of an increase in
 on RHSf and ^ f as in Panel (a) of Figure 3. The illustration leads to the following
result:
@f
@
> 0 for  2 (f   "; f );
@f
@
< 0 for  2  f ; f + " :
The result shows that an increase in  locally produces an inverse U-shaped relationship
between  and  f around  = ^ f .
The analysis and result apply to the equilibrium in which the decisive voter is a type-
c2 agent because the e¤ects of  on ]RHS
j
and ^ j are qualitatively similar between the
two types of agents, as demonstrated in (10) and (13).
Next, consider the equilibrium where the decisive voter is a type-c1 agent. Suppose
that  is initially given such that type-c1s preferred tax rate is  = ^ c1. We denote c1
as the  that makes a type-c1 young agent choose  = ^ c1. Because the properties of
]RHS
c1
in (10) and ^ c1 in (13) are opposite to those of ]RHS
f
and ^ f ; the saving pattern of
type-c1 agent around c1 is also opposite to that of type-f agents around f : That is, we
nd a positive real number "(> 0) around c1 such that the type-c1 agent is borrowing-
unconstrained for  2 (c1  "; c1) and borrowing-constrained for  2 [c1; c1+ "). The
equilibrium tax rate satises the following condition:
LHS  1  2 = RHSc1 
( 1
(+)() for  2 (c1   "; c1);
1


1
(+)()
1 
 () for  2 [c1; c1 + "):
Given the properties in (11) and (14), we obtain the following result:
@c1
@
> 0 for  2 (c1   "; c1);
@c1
@
< 0 for  2 (c1; c1 + ") :
The result shows that an increase in  locally produces an inverse U-shaped relationship
between  and  c1 around  = ^ c1.
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A.4.2 The e¤ect of  on the equilibrium tax rate: Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the decisive voter is a type-j (j = f; c1; c2) agent. Suppose that  is initially
given such that type-j0s preferred tax rate is  = ^ j. We denote j as the  that makes
a type-j agent choose  = ^ j.
Under the abovementioned situation, suppose that an increase in  around j locally
produces an inverse U-shaped relationship between  and type-js preferred tax rate.
This assumption implies that a decrease in  around j also locally produces an inverse
U-shaped relationship between  and type-js preferred tax rate. Therefore, it is su¢ cient
to show the e¤ect of an increase in  on the preferred tax rate by the decisive voter.
The analysis of the e¤ect of  applies to the current analysis because the e¤ects of 
on ]RHS
j
and ^ j are qualitatively similar to those of  on ]RHS
j
and ^ j. Therefore, we
obtain the result described in Proposition 3.
A.4.3 The e¤ect of  on the equilibrium tax rate: Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that  < (1 )=(1+) holds. The decisive voter is a type-f or type-c2 agent
(Lemma 1). The e¤ects of  on ]RHS
j
and ^ j (j = f; c2) are qualitatively similar to those
of  on ]RHS
j
and ^ j (j = f; c2). We can apply the analysis and result in Proposition 2
to the current case.
Next, suppose that  > (1   )=(1 + ) holds. The decisive voter is a type-f or
a type-c1 agent (Lemmas 2 and 3). The e¤ects of  on ]RHS
j
and ^ j (j = f; c1) are
qualitatively similar to those of  on ]RHS
c1
and ^ c1. We can apply the analysis and
result in Proposition 2 to the current case.
Finally, suppose that  = (1   )=(1 + ) holds. The parameter  has no e¤ect on
]RHS
j
and ^ j. A change in  has no e¤ect on the equilibrium tax rate.

A.5 The Case of a High Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitu-
tion: 1=  1
Figure 4 illustrates the conditions that determine the preferred tax rates by agents who
prefer taxation for the case of 1=  1. From the observation in Figure 4, we can conclude
that the decisive voter is a single female (j = f) agent if   (1  )= (see panels (a)
and (b)); this voter is an agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple (j = c1) if
 > (1  )= (see panels (c) and (d)).
[Figure 4 about here.]
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Proposition A1. Suppose that 1=  1 holds. There exists a unique equilibrium of the
voting game with  2 (0; 1=2). The decisive voter over  is
(i) a type-f , single female agent if   1 

;
(ii) a type-c1 agent who belongs to a one-breadwinner couple otherwise.
The result established in Proposition A1 has the following two features. First, an agent
who belongs to a two-breadwinner couple cannot become a decisive voter. Such agents
marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution in terms of utility is always higher than
the ratios of the other two types of households. This result implies that two-breadwinner
couples prefer a lower tax rate than do other two types of young agents.
Second, which household becomes a decisive voter depends on ;  and  that represent
the gender wage gap, life expectancy of men, and the fraction of derived pension rights,
respectively. Suppose that the gender wage gap is high (i.e.,  is low), the life expectancy
of men () is low, and the level of derived pension rights () is low such that  
(1  )=. Then, the marginal cost-to-benet ratio of redistribution in terms of utility
for single females is lower than that for one-breadwinner couples because the former owe
less tax burden whereas the latter receive lower pension benets. Therefore, single females
prefer a higher tax rate than do one-breadwinner couples and thus become decisive voters
if   (1  )=.
A.5.1 Comparative Statics Analysis
Consider the political equilibrium in an economy with 1=  1. Suppose that  
(1  )= holds: the decisive voter is a type-f agent (Proposition A1). The optimality
condition for a type-f agent, given by (4), indicates that a higher ]RHS
f
results in a lower
preferred tax rate except for the case of 1= = 1 and sf = 0:(
@f
@]RHS
f = 0 if 1= = 1 and sf = 0;
@f
@]RHS
f < 0 otherwise.
With the property of ]RHS
f
in (10) - (12), we obtain the following result:
@ f
@
 0; @
f
@
 0;
and
@ f
@
Q 0,  Q 1  
1 + 
:
Next, suppose that  > (1   )= holds: the decisive voter is a type-c1 agent
(Proposition A1). The optimality condition for a type-c1 agent, given by (5), indicates
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that a higher ]RHS
c1
results in a lower preferred tax rate except the case of 1= = 1 and
sc1 = 0: (
@c1
@]RHS
c1 = 0 if 1= = 1 and sc1 = 0;
@c1
@]RHS
c1 < 0 otherwise.
With the property of ]RHS
c1
in (10) - (12) and the assumption of  > (1   )=, we
obtain the following result:
@ c1
@
 0; @
c1
@
 0; @
c1
@
 0:
The result established in this appendix indicates monotone e¤ects of the parameters ; 
and  on the equilibrium tax rate.

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Figure 1.  The figure illustrates the case of γ ∈ ሾ(0, (1 − απ)/(1 + α)ሿ. In Panel (a), a 
type-f agent is a decisive voter; in Panel (b), a type-c2 agent is a decisive voter. 
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Figure 2. Panels (a), (b) and (c) illustrate cases of γ ∈ ቀଵିఈగଵାఈ ,݉݅݊ ቄ1,
ଵିఈగ
ఈ ቅቃ , γ ∈
ቀଵିఈగఈ ,݉݅݊ ቄ
ଵିఈగ
ఈఝ(ଵିఓ) , 1ቅቁ and γ ∈ ቂ
ଵିఈగ
ఈఝ(ଵିఓ) , 1ቃ, respectively. 
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Figure 3.  Panel (a) illustrates the saving pattern and the corresponding preferred tax 
rate by a type-j = f, c2 agent; Panel (b) illustrates the saving pattern and the 
corresponding preferred tax rate by a type-c1 agent; Panel (c) illustrates changes in the 
preferred tax rate by a type-j agent in response to an increase in α. 
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Figure 4. Panel (a) is the case of γ ∈ ቂ0, ଵିఈగଵାఈ ቃ; Panel (b) is the case of γ ∈ ቀ
ଵିఈగ
ଵାఈ ,
ଵିఈగ
ఈ ቃ; 
Panel (c) is the case of	γ ∈ ቀଵିఈగఈ ,
ଵିఈగ
ఈఝ(ଵିఓ)ቁ; and Panel (d) is the case of γ ∈ ቂ
ଵିఈగ
ఈఝ(ଵିఓ) , 1ቃ. 
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